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The Ibero-American Summit Process: 
Prospects, future development  
and incentives for Latin America
♦  
 
Joaquín Roy
♣ 
 
On November 4 and 5, 2006, a new Ibero-American summit will take place in Montevideo, 
Uruguay. This event will be one of the last epoch-making Latin American developments that 
have attracted attention of political analysts for a long year, among them a dozen presidential 
elections in Latin America that in part shook the foundations of political behavior and propelled a 
number of neo-populist leaders to power. While the historical balance of the Ibero-American 
process that aimed at its birth in 1991 for the formation os an Ibero-American Community of 
Nations is modest, the current circumstances make it this time an attractive exercise to be closely 
observed. While Latin America seems to be immersed in a crisis of regional integration, Europe 
is experiencing growing pains with the result of important casualties such as the derailment of the 
constitutional ratification in mid 2005. 
What is new this time in the Ibero-American setting is the inauguration of a new 
permanent Secretariat with site in Madrid, headed by former President of the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) Enrique Iglesias. Also new in the environment is the apparent 
abandonment of polemic encounters mostly staged by Cuban president Fidel Castro and his 
nemesis Spain’s Prime Minister José María Aznar. Calculating that a fight did not rendered him 
the expected results, he skipped recent gatherings (as well as the parallel EU-Latin America 
summits), leaving the scene to minor stars, much to the satisfaction of the local organizers. The 
fact that the Cuban leader has announced that he will reintegrate himself as attendant for the 
summit of Montevideo is a signal that an accommodating negotiation has been reached and that 
his cooperation for the success is guaranteed, under a friendlier environment.
1    
                                                           
     
♦ This paper is an updated version of a document presented in a summary format at a seminar on the Ibero-
American process, organized by the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) in Ottawa, on January 20, 2006. 
The author would like to express his gratitude for the invitation extended by Eduardo del Buey, Director, and Florencia 
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1 EFE, “Fidel Castro participará en Cumbre Iberoamericana de Uruguay”, 25 junio 2006. 
  3But the general process seemed to suffer from exhaustion and lack of concrete agenda, 
competing for repetitious objectives with half a dozen of intra-Latin American, inter-American, 
and European-Latin American networks. 
The new environment has not changed drastically, but a new agenda for the November 
2006 meeting has focused on problems that are shared by most of the members across the 
Atlantic. Development and migrations, with poverty eradication in sight or at least in mind, will 
be the focus of the new chapter, topics that no Latin American or Iberian leaders can claim to be 
alien to national preoccupations. With economic and free trade fictions off the negotiation table 
and political discussions dealing with the nature of democracy politely discarded, most of the 
leaders seem now to give the experiment a chance. Then, if it’s not the economy or politics 
(“stupid”, added), it’s cultural (linguistic, to be more precise) affinity at last the bond that glue 
nineteen Latin American and Iberian countries, with the novel inclusion of Andorra. 
In an era that constituencies seem to be afraid of loss of identity under the weigh of 
globalization, while states and governments engage in fights over resources and territories, with 
erosion of regional integration experiments, the rebirth of culture is given a center stage. With 
only the Portuguese and Francophone examples of similar organizations, the Ibero-American 
process will face the ultimate test for its survival and development. Must at stake is presented, 
and it is up to the leadership to show the weary citizens and business interests that it is worthy.                          
 
                        
Background 
 
The evolution of the Ibero-American summit process presents itself as a fascinating phenomenon 
to be observed from a variety of angles.
2 From its inception, it was rightly perceived as a 
naturally expected mission of foreign policy inspired by Spain for its modern reinsertion in Latin 
America.
3 It was also justified with a reasonable dose of historical obligation, if not vision, to 
strengthen the country’s Latin American historical links.
4 Taking advantage of the suitable 
                                                           
 
2 For a succinct summary of its short history, see: Christian Freres, “La corta historia de las cumbres. 1991-
2004” Celestino del Arenal (ed.). Las Cumbres Iberoamericanas (1991-2005). Logros y desafíos (Madrid: Fundación 
Carolina, 2005), pp. 1-26. 
 
3 For a panoramic view of commentary and proposals on Spain’s policy towards Latin America within the 
Ibero-American setting: Celestino del Arenal, “¿Cuál debe ser el papel de España en las Cumbres Iberoamericanas?” 
Real Instituto Elcano. DT 2004/12, 28/vi/2004; Celestino del Arenal, “El papel del España en las cumbres.” Real 
Instituto Elcano. DT 28/6/2004. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/124.asp; Celestino del Arenal, 
“Estados Unidos y la política latinoamericana de España”, Política Exterior, vol. XVII, nº 93, pp. 183-193; Celestino 
del Arenal. “La política española hacia América Latina en 2002,” en Anuario Elcano. América Latina 2002-03, 
(Madrid, Real Instituto Elcano, 2003), pp. 14-41; Celestino del Arenal, “La política exterior del gobierno socialista”. 
Política Exterior, 100, julio-agosto 2004, pp. 111-126; Celestino del Arenal, 1976-1992: Una nueva etapa en las 
relaciones de España con Iberoamérica (Madrid: Casa de América, 1994); Celestino del Arenal, Política Exterior de 
España hacia Iberoamérica, (Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1994); Carlos Malamud, “España y América Latina: 
el pulso entre lo global y lo bilateral”. Real Instituto Elcano.  (DT No. 48/2004 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/150.asp; Carlos Malamud, “España y América Latina: lo global y lo 
bilateral”. Política Exterior, 102, noviembre-diciembre 2004, pp. 13-24; Carlos Malamud, “La política española hacia 
América Latina: primar lo bilateral para ganar en lo global”. Informes Elcano. No. 3, mayo 2205. 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/publicaciones/libros/Inf_3.pdf; Carlos Malamud y Paul Isbell (eds.), Anuario Elcano 
de América Latina 2004-05 (Barcelona: Ariel/ Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2005); Manuel Alcántara, “Significados 
de las Cumbres Iberoamericanas para los gobiernos españoles,” Celestino del Arenal (ed.), Las Cumbres 
Iberoamericanas (1991-2005). Logros y desafíos, (Madrid: Fundación Carolina, 2005), pp. 199-217. 
 
4 For a selection of key milestones in this line, see: Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, Diplomacia 
franquista y política cultural hacia Iberoamérica, 1939-1953. (Madrid: CSIC, 1988); Montserrat Huguet Santos, 
Antonio Niño Rodríguez y Pedro Pérez Herrero, eds. La formación de la imagen de América Latina en España, 1898-
1989. (Madrid: OEI. 1992); José Luis de Imaz, Sobre la identidad Iberoamericana. (Buenos Aires: Editorial 
Sudamericana, 1984); Juan Carlos Pereira y Angel Cervantes, Relaciones diplomáticas entre España y América. 
(Madrid: Mapfre, 1992); Pedro Pérez Herrero y Núria Tabanera, eds., España/América latina: un siglo de políticas 
  4historical circumstances, it was strategically timed to coincide with the commemoration of the 
Quincentennary of Christopher Columbus’ travel in 1492 and the ultimate appointment of Spain 
(and Portugal) with destiny.
5  
In amicable and rather guarded terms, it was also perceived as the first political and 
cultural step toward a Reconquista of Latin America. This time the agenda was going to be 
accompanied by an economic strategy based on aggressive investments in key sectors, some of 
them opening up to the world market through a process of privatization.
6 The project since then 
has attracted the attention of analysts and has captured in different stages the energy of leaders on 
both sides of the Atlantic.
7 Its development has also filled considerable media space with 
anecdotal details that seem to be far away from the traditional foundational purposes.  
Hidden by a peripheral debate anchored around personal actions and single annual events 
is the crucial subject of the need to define the nature of the Ibero-American process and resulting 
lasting entity. Since its announcement, it has eluded proper classification in the ever-changing 
panorama of inter-state relations.
8 This rather academic angle is nonetheless badly needed if 
observers really wish to tackle with a minimum amount of success the analysis of its potential to 
compete in the world area, or at least in the inter-American setting. How this project 
comparatively related to, for example, the EU-Latin America-Caribbean summits, the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA), or even to the Organization of American States? A central 
question remains: What is the Ibero-American process, system, Community, or project? Just the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
culturales. (Madrid: OEI, 1993); Frederick B. Pike, "Hispanismo," 1898-1936: Spanish Conservatives and Liberals 
and Their Relations with Spanish America. (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971); Xavier Rubert de 
Ventós, El laberinto de la hispanidad. (Barcelona: Planeta, 1987); Isidro Sepúlveda Múñoz, Comunidad cultural e 
hispano-americanismo 1885-1936. (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 1994); Mark J.Van Aken, 
Pan-Hispanism: Its Origins and Development to 1886. (Los Angeles: California University Press, 1959); Carlos Rama, 
Historia de las relaciones culturales entre España y la América Latina. Siglo XIX. (México: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1982).  
 
5 For a sample of classic books on the subject: Celestino del Arenal y Alfonso Nájera, España e 
Iberoamérica. De la Hispanidad a la Comunidad Iberoamericana de Naciones (Madrid: CEDEAL, 1989); Celestino 
del Arenal y Alfonso Nájera, La Comunidad Iberoamericana de Naciones. Pasado, presente y futuro de la política 
iberoamericana de España (Madrid: CEDEAL, 1992); Castor M. Díaz Barrado, Perfiles de la Comunidad 
Iberoamericana de Naciones (Madrid: Casa de América, 1994); Silvia Enrich, Historia diplomática entre España e 
Iberoamérica en el contexto de las relaciones internacionales (1955-1985). (Madrid: Ediciones de Cultura Hispánica, 
1989); Victoria Galvani, El Rey y la Comunidad Iberoamericana. La filosofía y las tesis del iberoamericanismo de 
Espana en el reinado de Juan Carlos I (Madrid: CIPIE, 1987); Roberto Mesa, La idea de Comunidad Iberoamericana: 
Entre la utopía y la historia (Madrid: CEDEAL, 1989). 
 
6 Among the studies on Spain’s investment in Latin America, see:  Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, 
Inversión extranjera directa en América Latina: la perspectiva de los principales inversores (Madrid: IRELA, 1998); 
Ziga Vodusek (ed.), Inversión extranjera directa en América Latina: el papel de los inversores europeos (Washington, 
D.C.: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, 2002); Pablo Toral, The Reconquest of the New World: Multinational 
enterprises and Spain’s direct investment in Latin America (Aldershop: Ashgate, 2001); Félix Martín and Pablo Toral, 
eds., Latin America's Quest for Globalization: The Role of Spanish Firms (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005); Joseph M. Liso, 
Montserrat Soler, Montserrat Manero, y María Pilar Buil, La banca a l’Amèrica Llatina: reformes recents i perspective. 
(Barcelona: La Caixa, 2002); William Chislett, La inversión española directa en América Latina: retos y 
oportunidades (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2003); William Chislett, Spanish Direct Investment in Latin América: 
Challenges and Opportunities (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2003). 
 
7The recent literature includes the following: América Latina, hoy. Número especial. No. 40, Agosto (2005). 
http://iberoame.usal.es/publicaciones/americalatinahoy/index.htm; Celestino del Arenal (ed.), Las Cumbres 
Iberoamericanas (1991-2005). Logros y desafíos (Madrid: Fundación Carolina, 2005).  www.fundacioncarolina.es/; 
http://www.sigloxxieditores.com/1214.html; Comunica. El mañana es hoy . (Madrid: Comunica, 2005). 
http://www.cumbresiberoamericanas.com/principal.php?p=218; Raul Sanhueza, “El sistema de Cumbres 
Iberoamericanas”, en T. Mallo y L. Ruíz Jiménez (coords.), El sistema de Cumbres Iberoamericanas. Balance de una 
década y estrategias de consolidación (Madrid: Instituto Ortega y Gasset, 2002), pp. 21-33; Tribuna Americana. Casa 
de América -Real Instituto Elcano, “Especial XV Cumbre Iberoamericana de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno”. 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/especiales/CumbreIberoamerica2005/). 
 
8 Susanne Gratius, “La Cumbre Iberoamericana de Salamanca: ¿de una comunidad cultural a una alianza 
política?” (Madrid: FRIDE, 2005). http://www.fride.org/File/ViewFile.aspx?FileId=804 
 
  5variety of names given to the entity officially born in 1991 should be a clear sign of indecision 
and ambivalence. But that undefined sense of identity has happened before with many of the 
experiments in inter-state relations set in motion since the end of World War II.
9 
A series of constant contradictory signals have emanated from its summits and periodic 
declarations. For example, while official statements coincide with standard interpretations given 
by analysts, the Ibero-American system never officially aimed at having the structure of a 
standard international organization. However, it has frequently perplexed scholars when the entity 
in the making has taken some steps that show its intention to behave with distinct personality.
10 
For example, it has mirrored other cultural and linguistic frameworks (Commonwealth, 
Francophonie, the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries). In addition, like them, it has 
been admitted as an observer in the United Nations. In addition, what appeared to be at its birth a 
close club with a roster dictated by history, has recently added the tiny Principat of Andorra as a 
new member. 
Geographically, the foundation of the Ibero-American process has to take into account 
the pre-existence of an elaborate inter-American system with a long history and in constant state 
of realignment. The Ibero-American format has tried not to give the impression of duplication, 
competition, or interference with the Organization of American States and any of the inter-
American organizations and entities that included all or most of the Western Hemisphere 
countries.
11 At the same time, declarations have made the effort of offering the Ibero-American 
project as complementary for the Latin American frameworks.      
In a micro context, the planned institutionalization of the project with the setting in place 
of a permanent General Secretariat deserves a more in-depth analysis using innovative concepts 
and tools, not limited to the standard framework employed for studying international 
organizations, strictly trade-oriented links, or political alliances. In sum, the Ibero-American 
process defies classification. Still, scholars and casual observers need to offer an evaluation for its 
potential to meet its vaguely stated foundational purposes and obtain the recently set goals 
through its innovative institutionalized structure. 
To begin with, observers must ponder an apparent contradiction regarding the timing of 
its foundation. The Ibero-American project was set in motion precisely when Spain and Portugal 
had consolidated their position in the European integration setting, as full members of what then 
was called the European Community, ready to become the European Union. Their membership in 
the European adventure founded in 1950 was a priority not to be surpassed in priority level by 
any other linkage with any other region in the world. The insertion of Portugal and Spain, the two 
Iberian countries in the European Community meant to be a contribution to an unusual enterprise. 
Historical records and rigorous analysis have shown that this is the most ambitious and successful 
experiment of European integration ever attempted and executed through pacific means, not by 
force or annexation. For the two former sea world powers with an indelible imprint in the 
Americas, this was a fitting homecoming. 
Paradoxically, both states (with Spain at the helm, must be understood) then implicated 
themselves in an intercontinental project across the Atlantic. This move appeared to be a 
distraction from their central Old World agenda of full reinsertion in the nucleus from which they 
                                                           
 
9 Joaquín Roy, “La naturaleza de la Unión Europea”, in La Unión Europea y el TLCAN: integración regional 
comparada y relaciones mútuas (México: UNAM, 2004);  Alejandro Chanona y Roberto Domínguez, compiladores, 
pp. 183-202; “The Nature of the European Union,” in Peter Van Der Hoek (ed.), Public Administration and Public 
Policy in the European Union (N.Y.: Taylor and Francis, 2005), pp. 77-111. 
 
10 Among the recent comparative analysis, see: Carlos Malamud, “Las cumbres iberoamericanas en el 
actual escenario  mundial”. Celestino de Arena, Las Cumbres Iberoamericanas (1991-2005). Logros y desafíos 
(Madrid: Fundación Carolina, 2005), pp. 27-45. 
 
11 For a panoramic view of the insertion of themes of civil society in the summits of the Americas, see: Diana 
Tussie y Mercedes Broto, “Las cumbres de las Américas: una nueva plataforma para la sociedad civil.” América Latina, hoy. 
Número especial. No. 40, Agosto 2005, pp.73-91. 
  
  6were banned for decades because of the nature of their respective dictatorial regimes. The least 
one is tempted to say is that the Ibero-American move was apparently an unnecessary example of 
overstretching for the two countries that entered the EC as net recipients of aid. They were in 
need of behaving properly and concentrating on having their homework done on time and 
efficiently. Portugal could claim then that it was a member of other European economic 
frameworks and a founder of NATO. In turn, Spain managed to lessen its initial isolation after the 
Civil War by inserting itself in the military network led by the United States during the height of 
the Cold War. But the fact was that the crown jewel sought by Madrid and Lisbon was to have 
full seats in Brussels.
12 In fact, Spain’s rise to international activity attracted the attention of 
scholars world-wide, using the domestic political evolution as a model for transitions and its new 
influential foreign policy as a stark contrast to traditional isolation.
13 
Oddly, just when the Ibero-American project began its journey towards a sort of 
unknown destination with an eye set on the rear view mirror of history, the new European 
Community was re-baptized as the European Union by the Treaty of Maastricht ratified in 1992. 
It was another decisive European “bold step” according to the original script of the Schuman 
Declaration issued on May 9, 1950, following the script by Jean Monnet, aiming at a “closer 
union”. At the same time, after fulfilling the mandate of the Single European Act of 1986 that set 
the completion of the Common market, the new EU decided on the adoption of the euro as a 
common currency.  
By coincidence, fate or design, the year 1992 fused a historical commemoration skillfully 
chosen by Spain with an ambitious EU chapter. The same argument could be raised regarding the 
EU timing. However, comparing the resources given to both projects, the EU showed an 
advantage. Analysts then pondered if the Spanish initiative would survive the event-centered 
opportunity, lacking the impressive financial resources that the re-launching of the European 
adventure enjoyed. Among the many differences between the EU and other international 
organizations and alliances is that the European framework has a well-financed budget run by 
independent institutions.      
Historians and political analysts rightly have pointed out that the European-wide 
integration process has been based since its beginning on a volunteer consensus agreed upon by 
states that had been at war since times immemorial. Their inexorable path towards self-
destruction was recognized as caused by the perverse hyper obsession on national sovereignty 
stressing parochial differences in history, languages and social structures. Worse, a messianic 
sense of racial and ethnic superiority led to tragedy and holocaust. Hence, the self-imposed 
pooling of sovereignty was implemented step by step through the functionalist method, while 
respecting national peculiarities and characteristics. It was the negative aspects of European 
                                                           
 
12 For a sample of studies evaluating the experience of the Iberian countries in the EU, see Joaquín Roy y 
Aimee Kanner, "España y Portugal en la Unión Europea," México: Universidad Autónoma de México (UNAM), 2001; 
Sebastián Royo and Paul C. Manuel (eds.), Spain and Portugal in the European Union: The First Fifteen Years (NY: 
Frank Cass, 2003); Sebastián Royo, Portugal, Espanha e a Integração Europeia: Um Balanço (Lisbon: Instituto de 
Ciencias Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa, 2005). 
 
13 For a selection of books, see: Richard Gillespie, Fernando Rodrigo, y Jonathan Story (eds.), Las relaciones 
exteriores de la España democrática (Madrid: Alianza,1995); Carlos Alonso Zaldívar, and Manuel Castells, Spain 
Beyond Myths (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992); José María Armero, La política exterior de Franco (Barcelona: Planeta, 
1978); Rafael Calduch, ed., La política exterior española en el siglo XX (Madrid: Ed. Ciencias Sociales, 1994); Lorenzo 
Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, Imperio de papel. Acción cultural y política exterior durante el primer franquismo (Madrid: 
CSIC, 1992); Kenneth Maxwell and Steve Spiegel, The New Spain: From Isolation to Influence (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations Press, 1994). Kenneth Maxwell, ed. Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1991); Mesa, Roberto, Democracia y política exterior (Barcelona: EUDEMA, 1988); Fernando Morán, España en su sitio 
(Barcelona: Plaza y Janés/Cambio 16, 1990); Fernando Morán, Una política exterior para España (Barcelona: Planeta, 
1980); Juan Carlos Pereira, Introducción al estudio de la política exterior de España (siglos XIX y XX). (Madrid: Akal, 
1983); Benny Pollack and Graham Hunter, The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy: Spain's International Relations from 
Franco to Democracy (London: Pinter, 1987). 
 
  7history that were not to be repeated at any cost. The future of a will to belong to a cooperative, 
pragmatic project using economic means was the focus of an inclusive, self-contained sense of 
identity. 
 
The nature of the creature 
 
Although it was a Spanish idea to have the first foundational summit held in Spain, pragmatism 
and vision exercised by the Spanish government led by Felipe González and King Juan Carlos I 
grabbed the occasion of presenting it to the Mexican government.
14 Mexican authorities then 
were yearning to expand their international stardom when the country was just coming out of an 
authoritarian, one party system. They were also looking for ways to balance the upcoming 
dependency of the United States through the assembly of the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA). The first summit was then held in Guadalajara, Mexico, as a sort of preparation for the 
impressive setting staged by the commemoration of the Quincentenary of the Discovery of 
America by Columbus in 1992. 
Looking backwards, the new experiment needed not to repeat the mistakes of bygone 
eras. Symbolic of the new approach was the more inclusive label of “Ibero-America” that aimed 
to fuse limited expressions such as Latin America, in which Spain and Portugal could not fit, 
sidestepping imperial, traditional Spanish-led concepts such as Hispanidad. Although Portugal 
has never been at ease with the concept of “Iberia” that it claims to be Spain-dominated, the 
global approach caught the space reserved and became the standard expression used in the official 
literature of Spain to refer to Latin America as an entity at the other side of the Atlantic, and also 
of the inclusive group incorporating Spain and Portugal. By using this label, the Spanish 
government also intended to neutralize the universally accepted tag of Latin America, historically 
an invention of France to reinforce its presence in a continent in transition since the demise of the 
Spanish empire.   
It was the Spanish government that carried the brunt of the responsibility and covered the 
expenses of the inaugural efforts. This was also going to become the routine in the following 
decade. It was an obligatory gesture of noblesse oblige that ultimately endangered the process, 
tinged by Spanish dependency. The whole terminological and conceptual framework got inserted 
into the perennial polemic over the appropriateness of the different levels to describe diverse 
lineups of the Latin American nations. While Pan-Americanism has usually described a format to 
which the United States belongs and traditionally has dominated, Monroism has been employed 
as a critical weapon to decry U.S. hegemony. Indo-America, a label invested by Perú’s Haya de la 
Torre, has not caught in the whole continent, while Hispanidad and Hispanoamericanismo has 
been countered as leaning towards the dependency on Spain. Hence the convenience of the all-
inclusive term Ibero-America.                
With this and other thoughts in mind, the wider context in which the new enterprise was 
inserted was composed, as far as Spain is concerned (and to a considerable extent, Portugal, too), 
of the incorporation of the Spanish democracy in different adventures of regional integration, 
peace-making and peace-keeping plans, and a multitude of international organizations and 
alliances. All this was happening just a decade after Spain and the Vatican were the only 
European states that did not belong to any major international alliance or network with the 
exception of the United Nations. This new fever of joining was humorously described as a geo-
political variance of the “apuntarse a todo” syndrome (signing up for anything). In any event, two 
key factors that needed to be fused for the success of the operation were to become the twin 
jewels of the crown for this occasion. This cliché is justified in the context of the 30
th anniversary 
                                                           
 
14 Celestino del Arenal, “Las cumbres iberoamericanas: el largo y difícil camino hacia su 
institucionalización” América Latina, hoy. Número especial. No. 40, Agosto 2005, pp. 57-72. 
 
  8of King Juan Carlos’ accession to the Spanish throne and was the excuse for the celebration of the 
XVth summit in Salamanca.  
One factor was the permanent installation of Spain in the European Community (EC) that 
was becoming the European Union (EU), effective since its accession along with Portugal in 
1986. The second was the undisputed Ibero-American vocation of Spain, a centerpiece of the 
official discourse that no Spanish government or regime can afford to sidestep. Many observers 
are perplexed by the fact that Spain’s national holiday (although questioned in some quarters or 
regions) is not a call for independence, a famous battle, or the monarch’s birthday. It is celebrated 
on October 12th, the day Columbus arrived in 1492 on the tiny island of Guanahani, named San 
Salvador, in today’s Bahamas. Language expansion and migration of millions of Spaniards to 
Latin America have provided the glue of what is called “a special relationship” with deep family 
connotations.       
Covered by this historical background, the new Spanish impulse received its decisive 
(and hopefully final) endorsement in 1992 with a three-fold agenda formed by the celebration of 
the 500
th anniversary of Columbus’ feat with the organization of a world exhibit in Seville, the 
Olympic Games held in Barcelona, and the award of European Cultural Capital to be bestowed on 
the city of Madrid. However, this impressive, spectacular start began to fade away with inertia in 
the second part of the 90s. The Salamanca summit has attempted to address the fact that the 
energy employed during the first stage barely had survived in the new century.                    
In this setting, the peculiarity of the project significantly known in its inception in 
Spanish political and scholarly circles as the “Ibero-American Community of Nations” resides on 
the fact that it was not supposed to be a variant of a “civic nation of nations”. This was actually 
the foundational message of the European Union, fearful of intolerant nationalism, producing 
fights among neighbors, with tragic consequences of universal impact. Instead, the Ibero-
American project presented itself as a sort of “cultural supernation”, spanning two continents. 
From Santiago de Chile to Oporto, from Seville to Montevideo, from Bahía to Ciudad Real, from 
Bogotá to La Paz, history and cultural legacy were to be the center of cohesion and sole bonding 
of this new experiment. The new project did not have as an objective the seeking of development 
funds, gathering of economic resources, aiming at lowering trade barriers, or sharing military 
might as a protection facing common enemies. The pooling of history and culture was apparently 
the only aim.     
Curiously enough, from the start, the main attractiveness of the process and its major 
weapon was composed of the obvious counterpoint presented by the Ibero-American proposal in 
a world that since the end of the Cold War has been under the threatening force of globalization 
that looks with disdain on identity and the intimacy of national societies. Against a world-wide 
trend, the Ibero-American “community” seemed to be waiving a flag showing a sense of a 
primordial identity, original belonging, simply justified by an accepted historical colonial 
bonding past and two similar and mostly mutually intelligible languages (Spanish and 
Portuguese) coming from a common root.
15 In fact, with no other explicit membership 
requirements, such as military purposes (as in NATO), geographical constraints (to be in Europe, 
in the EU) or economic indicators (deficit ceilings, inflation, etc.), the Ibero-American entity 
makes the point of mentioning in very clear terms the only condition for inclusion: Portuguese of 
Spanish as languages. The foundational Declaration of the I Summit held in Guadalajara, México, 
says that the heads of state and government have decided to found the Ibero-American 
Conference “with the participation of the sovereign States of America and Europe of Spanish and 
                                                           
 
15 For a commentary from the Spanish diplomatic perspective, see: Yago Pico de Coaña, “Las Cumbres 
Iberoamericanas como foro de concertación política,” Celestino del Arenal (ed.), Las Cumbres Iberoamericanas (1991-
2005). Logros y desafíos (Madrid: Fundación Carolina, 2005), pp. 107-141. 
 
  9Portuguese language”.
16 Successive declarations simply repeat the listing of the member 
countries adding this sole sign of identity: Spanish and Portu
17 guese.   
                                                          
However, the linguistic clause is limited to American and European countries with the 
result of the exclusion of other countries that have neither Spanish nor Portuguese as official, 
majority, or minority languages. For example, former Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Africa 
do not belong. But Andorra, with only Catalan as an official language, is a new member in 
recognition of the wide use of Spanish. Effective membership was agreed on the principle that the 
roster of languages in the Ibero-American group would not be expanded and that the Pyrenees 
country would be represented by its executive elected government and not by the co-sovereigns, 
the President of France and the Bishop of the neighbor Catalan town of La Seu d’Urgell. 
This linguistic requirement and unique link left open for speculation and frequent 
commentaries the fact that between 30 and 50 million (depending on what the criteria are) of 
Hispanics live in the United States, making this country the second or third most populous 
Spanish-speaking country in the world,
18 in addition to the special status of Puerto Rico. 
Membership or observer status have been contemplated and discussed in political and media 
circles, but the original roster has been maintained. Ironically, this steady policy of keeping the 
distance with the Hispanic presence in the United States is contradictory with the alarming claim 
espoused by some U.S. commentators against an “invasion” of Spanish speakers in what has been 
considered as a basically Anglo-Protestant entity.
19                           
In any event, the international nature of the scheme presented a challenge for its 
operability. This is an obstacle that apparently did not seem to bother the Ibero-American 
“founding fathers”, a condition that was open to whoever could claim it, with patrician 
satisfaction of the Spanish leaders, the original inventors of the creature. They (Latin American 
and Iberian) were satisfied by the apparent self-evident sustainability of the project crafted by 
previously existent and unquestionable solid bonds.  
The historically certified existence of the new entity was supposed to be as rock-solid as 
the right to be that nation-states of ethnic, cultural, “German” variance customarily claim. 
Belonging to “Ibero-America” was a sort of a medal bestowed by history. It was not created by 
self-described will, endorsed by fulfilling meeting entrance requirements. The Ibero-American 
“family” was self-inclusive – you did not have a choice regarding membership. The most a state 
could do is to decline the initial invitation. The record shows that none refused the call. None has 
since expressed a desire to leave. How could they have done otherwise? This specificity deserves 
an explanation that is apparently very simple. The group has existed before its formal foundation. 
The Ibero-American project was a family that simply needed to be registered.  In comparative 
terms, it was a de facto family, or common law union that deserved to be legalized.          
While the concept of “family” varies with civilizations, it is well understood among the 
Ibero-American societies that the “extended family” is comprised of at least three generations and 
it includes cousins. While there are fights in all families, extended or reduced, a sort of secret pact 
precluded any of the existing Ibero-American states from resisting attendance in the first 
“reunions” (to use the Anglo-American term) that the summits seemed to be. To guarantee 
 
 
16 See the explicit notation in Lía Varela, Jaime Otero, “Hacia una política lingüística iberoamericana” Real 
Instituto Elcano. AIR 145, 2005. http://www.r-i-elcano.org/analisis/856.asp 
 
17 For a selection of commentaries on the importance of languages in the Ibero-American group, see: 
Fernando R. Lafuente y Javier Escudero, “El español en Brasil”. Política Exterior, 102, noviembre-diciembre 2004, pp. 
101-112.; Jaime Otero, “La comunidad panhispánica: para la proyección global del español” Política Exterior, 101, 
setiembre-octubre 2004, pp. 31-39. 
 
18 For a classic book: Alberto Moncada. Norteamérica con acento hispano (Madrid: Instituto de Cultura 
Hispánica, 1988);  As a recent addition to the literature on the topic, see: Juan Manuel Romero de Terreros, España y 
las Comunidades Hispanas (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación, 2005). 
 
19 Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We?—The Challenges to America's National Identity. (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 2004); ¿Quiénes somos? Los desafíos a la identidad nacional estadounidense. (Barcelona: Paidós, 2004). 
  
 10maximum attendance, the organizers (Spain leading) went to extremes not to set membership 
requirements beyond the conditioning presented by historical linkages. This meant that highly 
developed countries and less fortunate developing ones would sit at the same table, while 
governments just coming out of dictatorships or in danger of reverting to this condition would 
also dialogue with impeccable democracies.  
The Ibero-American group also presents a distinction with other alliances formed by 
former empires and their now independent colonies. In contrast with the British and French 
colonial structures that have recently disappeared, the Spanish and Portuguese date back their 
demise to a period between one and two centuries. Loyalty and need for protection is therefore 
different in the Commonwealth and even in the initial setting of the ACP group composed mostly 
of former French colonies than in the case of Latin American links with the Iberian states.
20                             
In a similar comparative context, one can easily note that the Ibero-American process 
contrasts with membership conditions presented by the EU. These (economic and political) are 
self-evident since the foundation, and have been reinforced by the Copenhagen criteria. Strict 
requirements do not allow the compromise of wishy-washy pragmatic deals such as it has 
customary been in NATO, where military-controlled regimes (Greece, Turkey) have 
accompanied founding members such as Portugal, ruled by the Oliveira Salazar dictatorship. At 
the Ibero-American table explicit dictatorial regimes such as Cuba, barely leaving the alliance 
with the Soviet Union, were to sit with equal rights along clean, EU label-certified, and transition 
model democracies for academic world-wide analysis as Portugal and Spain. These two Iberian 
countries were to be in the company of Latin American standing points of reference such as Costa 
Rica, along states that were to change governments by a variety of unorthodox means not always 
governed by the ballots (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Argentina). At the same time, 
Mexico, an important member in any Latin American lineup, was just coming out of a one-party 
system reigning for six decades, was invited to hold the first summit in 1991.  
In other words, while in the EU bloc a new member is pressed to present a dossier that 
includes a good democratic and economic conduct certificate, it is also an accepted understanding 
that the cultural, linguistic, historical, and customs peculiarities are so ample that it is assumed 
that the innate nature of Europe is its diversity in interpreting a basic common legacy shared in 
strikingly different degrees. This belonging to a political community that was bound by economic 
tools with clear cut rules contrasts with the Ibero-American Community in which one enters (in 
fact, one belongs since centuries ago) by cultural affinity, in which political and even economic 
differences are strictly respected. For this and other reasons, observers (in Spain and elsewhere) 
have dealt with this experiment with a mixture of skepticism, questioning its effective potential as 
an entity that competes in the already crowded world of international organizations and coalitions 
of all sorts.  
 
Remodeling the premises 
           
In any event, since its foundation (or its re-foundation, if one considers that the Ibero-American 
Community has existed for centuries) in 1991, much has happened in this family. In October 
2005 in Salamanca a new chapter was opened towards a crucial stage that should be the key for 
the success or failure of the cycle inaugurated in Guadalajara, Mexico. Media records and other 
literature distinctly show that at the time the label floated by the official discourse emanating 
from Madrid was the “Community of Ibero-American Nations”. This is an impressive and 
ambitious concept that has been inexorably demoted from the official declarations, only to be 
                                                           
 
20 Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons, and Wayne Sandholtz, “After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial 
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 11used figuratively referring to the overall historically-link group, and with certain stylistic rhetoric. 
Coinciding with the crafting of the “European Economic Space”, the pre-enlargement of the EU 
that was to convert it from an entity of 12 to 25 in 2004, the expression “Ibero-American Space:” 
began to be used in official literature, permeating the scholarly analysis.
21 Then the word 
“Conference” was also used to describe the different configurations of ministerial gatherings and 
other gatherings. Finally the rather mundane and abused term “summit” captured the official 
public seal, although it only legally describes the annual high meeting of the presidents of Latin 
America, Spain and Portugal (with these two countries doubly represented by the heads of state 
and government).
22 
In sum, what is popularly known as the “Ibero-American Summit” is just an annual 
meeting of heads of state and government, lasting only two days. What remains afterwards when 
everyone goes home is the Ibero-American Conference, structured in the summit itself, the 
meetings of ministers of Foreign Affairs,  the national coordinators of each country, and the 
administrators of development aid programs. The "armed branch" is then the Ibero-American 
General Secretariat (SEGIB). Consequently, the Conference is a structure that works for the 
service of the Ibero-American Community, composed of 19 Latin American countries, and the 
three European states (Spain, Portugal and Andorra).
23 For lack of a comprehensive treaty, 
experts have suggested that the Ibero-American system has been composed of two “high level 
structures” (the summits of the Heads of States and Government, and the meetings of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs), three “continuity” structures (Pro Tempore Secretariat, Troika, Extended 
Troika), “management structures” (national coordinators, cooperation officers, joint meetings), 
“permanent organs” (the Ibero-American Cooperation Secretariat to be succeeded by the Ibero-
American General Secretariat) and “Conference Forums” (ministerial meetings, cooperation 
programs).
24 
          In this context, the moment of truth had arrived with the preparations of the summit to be 
held in the emblematic Castilian town of Salamanca on October 14-15, 2005. Taking into account 
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22 For a selection of analysis on the evolution of the summit process and its Secretariat, see: Celestino del 
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 12that the event would also serve as a fitting scenario for the inauguration of the institutionalization 
process with the addition of the General Secretariat with its site located in Madrid, the Spanish 
government had much at stake and was not going to leave any stone unturned. The naming of the 
first Secretary General was the culmination of a mandate that was initiated in the XII Summit 
held in Bávaro, Dominican Republic, in 2002 by entrusting a report to a Commission presided by 
former Brazilian president and scholar Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
25 The mission was to study 
the process and the feasibility of its improvement and wider international presence. The Cardoso 
report had as its main terms of reference to consult with a group of experts and to present its 
conclusions in the following XIII Summit to be held in Bolivia in 2004. The conclusions included 
as main recommendations the institutionalization of the existing “system of conferences”, to 
elevate the status of the existing Ibero-American Secretariat of Cooperation (SECIB) to the rank 
of Ibero-American Permanent Secretariat (SEGIB), to study the necessary mechanisms and 
processes to make Ibero-American cooperation more effective, and to study the petitions of new 
memberships.
26 In Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, the General Secretariat was approved, leading 
to the approval of its statute in the XIV Summit held in Costa Rica in 2004. The path was open 
towards a more ambitious chapter of the process, with considerable challenges.
27                
        That was not an easy task for the new Spanish government elected after the March 14
th, 2004 
terrorist attacks in Madrid. The new Spanish administration led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero 
has inherited a project (especially the creation of the Permanent Secretariat) that was the result of 
a u-turn strategy executed after 2002 by the Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar, electing to 
make unilateral initiatives in the summit process. Moreover, the striking, controversial and 
fractuous behavior of the Spanish president in the course of the summits resulting in encounters 
with some of his colleagues was worsened by the alliance formed with President Bush over the 
war in Iraq. This Atlantic dimension suffered a spillover effect when some members (Chile and 
Mexico) of the Ibero-American family were publicly lobbied by Aznar to endorse the U.S.-UK 
attitude in the Security Council, of which Spain was then a non-permanent member. The Ibero-
American bloc was further split by the assembly of a military brigade named Plus Ultra to 
participate in the occupation of Iraq with troops of El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Dominican Republic partially equipped and trained by Spanish command. The perception that 
Spain defended U.S. interests in the Ibero-American setting worsened its fragile status. 
Meanwhile, Spain’s role in the core of the EU got in trouble by its becoming a leader in blocking 
measures and unnecessarily delaying the constitutional consensual process. 
In this setting, the new Spanish government inherited a dilemma. On one hand, the installation of 
the General Secretariat, the pivotal project of the Ibero-American process, was planned according 
to the unilateral pattern exercised by Aznar, but it was implemented with certain professionalism 
and a dose of lack of inclusiveness by Cardoso that still raised concerns in many Latin American 
quarters. On the other hand, the need for the institutionalization of the process was unavoidable. 
The essence of the project was unquestionable. Rodríguez Zapatero could not afford risk of 
appearing as the cause of the derailment of an enterprise that had been considered as a matter of 
state. The setting of the previous summit held in Costa Rica had caught the new Spanish 
administration under a deluge of pending business while addressing the priority of damage 
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 13control in the more important context of the European Union. Consequently, the scheduled 
Salamanca summit had to be addressed with unusual professionalism, political energy and 
resources. 
        As first step, a special meeting of ministers of foreign affairs held in Guimaraes, Portugal, in 
May 2005, agreed on the appointment of the new first Secretary General. Another ministerial 
meeting held in September 2005 in New York during the UN General Assembly annual gathering 
appointed Enrique Iglesias, a prestigious Uruguayan official of Spanish birth, as first Secretary 
General. After seventeen years of leading the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the 
appointment of Iglesias became without doubt the most important development of the Ibero-
American adventure. Simultaneously, Brazil’s Maria Elisa Berenguer was named as Deputy 
Secretary General and Mexico’s Miguel Hakim as Secretary for Cooperation. Iglesias is also 
backed by a cabinet of experienced professionals led by Nicaraguan Edmundo Jarquín. A staff of 
about 30 professionals is currently working, or in the process of appointments, in the headquarters 
located in Madrid and funded by a budget of over € 5 million.
28          
        During the months preceding the summit, several high-profile officials canvassed the Latin 
American capitals taking tally of each and all of the presidents committed to attend the 
Salamanca gathering. Vice President María Teresa Fernández de la Vega (who presided the 
Commission to oversee the preparations of the summit) visited several key Latin American 
capitals in key sub regions and conducted personal interviews with presidents to guarantee the 
promise of a full house for the summit. However, final attendance had some casualties, most of 
them justified for natural disasters emergencies affecting Central America (El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Guatemala) and political crisis looming over Ecuador. The final no-show of Fidel 
Castro was in a way a blessing in disguise, because it relieved the organizers from the pressure to 
stand customary demonstrations against him and the expected protagonist role to take. However, 
the pattern of absences in previous summits confirmed that in the calculations of the Cuban 
leader, the risks of confrontation and demands of extradition presented in Spanish courts did not 
match the expected advantages.  
                     
The balance 
 
In spite of the bad omens dictated by the inertia of the past, this new stage has started on a 
moderately impressive good step, highlighted by the appointment of Enrique Iglesias as first 
permanent Secretary General. A consensus of observers keenly points out that his personal 
prestige and impeccable credentials are such that he cannot afford a failure and institutional loss 
for his backers, which include King Juan Carlos himself. However, the record inherited by him is 
rather ambivalent and riddled by contradiction and enigmas that only time will clarify.     
        As outlined above, just the oscillation of the original name of Ibero-American Community to 
land on the rather modest “summit” is an emblematic symbol of what had happened to the 
pioneer idea. What for some of the designers was to be a replica of the British Commonwealth 
and the Francophonie, enhanced with a true multilateral protagonist role at both sides of the 
Atlantic, centered around historical and cultural values fully shared by all the members, was en 
route kidnapped by personal vanities, erratic interpretations, and the selection of a vague agenda 
that seems to be impractical, at times utopian, and repetitive with other regional schemes. 
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 14Since its foundation, what has been called “summitry” (“cumbritis” in a more sarcastic Spanish) 
as part of an innovative jargon to describe new forms of inter-state relations after the end of the 
Cold War, was enthroned to preside the Ibero-American process.
29 In fact, this “presidential” 
profile has been considered by some scholars as positive in avoiding the stalemate of traditional 
“parliamentary” structures dominating standard international organizations.
30 It appeared that in 
Iberia and Latin America a consensus was build to resist at all cost the putting in place of a 
minimum structure that would serve as a base to implement and follow up agreements made in 
the late hours of the annual gatherings. Ministers and civil societies were left out of the process, 
depending on the wishes of the top officials, backed by national sovereignty and the obligation to 
reach a consensus under the threat of a veto.  
         Meanwhile, this pattern was going to compete with a proliferation of similar summits to be 
held in the Americas either at the wide continental level or at the more modest sub-regional 
setting. This inter-American fever matched a worldwide trend making the agenda of presidents 
and prime ministers virtually impossible. The Ibero-American summits, refusing to meet at 
intervals longer than the annual gatherings because small countries feared to lose the chance to 
preside and play hosts, then primed provisionality over substance and systematizing. Bold 
national challenges and public personal postures transformed diplomatic negotiations and 
consensus building into sorry confrontations. The use and abuse of particular agendas from the 
outside of the country for domestic purposes and media attraction demoted the common destiny 
and legacy to unknown depths. Then, sane leaders (if not the King of Spain himself) had to rush 
behind the scenes to craft a minimum common denominator to salvage what remained of the 
collective cohesiveness. With very little substance to show as a final record, some individual 
cameo appearances captured the media limelight. Too often, some specific leaders (one Spanish 
and one Cuban) distinguished themselves in manipulating the nature of the summit to channel 
domestic strategies with ambitious international outreach. 
Former Spanish premier Aznar, under whose double mandate (1996-2004), in a more 
acute fashion since 2002, the Ibero-American concept and in general Spanish-Latin American 
relations were damaged, is as guilty as Fidel Castro in derailing the Ibero-American process. The 
Cuban president for life, went from acting as a very uncomfortable prima donna of the annual 
“show” to opt for absence in recent years, a trend confirmed by skipping Salamanca. He saw that 
he was not obtaining the results expected and he could not stand demonstrations against his 
regime. As a consequence, he made the performance of his security services unbearable for the 
hosts and the summits in general, especially when they were held in sites with a minimum of 
openness and in countries run by governments considered neutral or critical of the Cuban regime.  
In any event, it was obvious that the lightly-set Ibero-American process was not to be 
allowed to become the proper setting to send bold challenges of a duel-like nature with very little 
chances of obtaining the results sought. Challenging an adversary with a chess-like move had 
many spectacular and headlines grabbing consequences but not the final objective of forcing a 
dictatorial regime to change course. “Mover ficha” has become a standard in the Spanish political 
vocabulary since Aznar challenged Castro in Viña del Mar, Chile, to reform his system if 
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 15expecting to receive European aid and understanding. But this only resulted in strengthening the 
intolerance of the Cuban policies and producing personal insults. Moreover, the summit may not 
be the best setting for extracting impractical declarations such as branding the United States as 
guilty of international terrorism. Reasonable logic and a dose of pragmatic attitude recommend a 
return to the legitimate and original agenda of cultural integration. Upon this base, the process 
can address some pressing items such as poverty reduction and eradication of social exclusion. 
 
Prospects 
 
Most observers in Latin America (and in Spain, too) agree that Enrique Iglesias has a golden 
opportunity within his reach to culminate his brilliant career. To this end, he would have to enjoy 
the blessing and active cooperation (as if they were citizens of a “civic nation”) of his superiors in 
this enterprise, the key leaders of the Ibero-American group. The problem is that one can expect a 
state consensus in Spain regarding the Ibero-American project than can be rebuilt with at least a 
not very confrontational attitude of the Partido Popular. However, this dimension of foreign 
policy that was the subject of a national consensus between the two main political formations has 
been recently shattered after the defeat of the PP in the March 2004 elections. While political 
confrontations in Latin America and Portugal over the Ibero-American project are not the norm, 
inertia and lukewarm enthusiasm that disappear after the summits are the main negative obstacles. 
All this simply means that a clear-cut consensus to be crafted between Prime Minister 
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and half a dozen of his influential counterparts will have to wait 
until new presidents coming out of the new elections to be held in 2006 have a solid hold of their 
offices. Uncertainties of the election results make this scenario a tricky one, to say the least. 
Moreover, the prospects of a deepening in the leftist profile of some of the new presidents make 
the cooperation of the moderates and conservatives leaders even more problematic.        
In the meanwhile, some positive signals are to be taken into consideration. They may 
greatly contribute to the final success of the operation of the reborn “Community” (a label that 
deserves to be unearthed and brought to the forefront). They also are key factors for the basic 
cohesion that still exists among the countries that share the Spanish and Portuguese languages. 
A mild correction in the ambivalent Portuguese attitude towards the process has been detected. 
Portugal has been aware of its limited capacity in Latin America (even in Brazil). Since the times 
of the political transition and most especially since the moment that along with Spain, Portugal 
became a member of the European Union, Lisbon has been very careful not to increase the 
dependency on Spanish investment and the overpowering presence of the big neighbor. 
Respectful and willing to appear cooperative, Portuguese leaders appeared to accept the Ibero-
American project with unpretentious enthusiasm without showing any resistance. Priming its 
European presence and the advantageous alliance with the United States, Africa had taken 
precedence over Latin America. Portugal is not a point of reference in Brazil, or at least not in the 
way as Spain is in most of Latin America. But then Portugal has to take for granted the existence 
of an “Ibero-American cultural nation”, but it still needs to register that it is in its interest to 
belong to a “civil Ibero-American bloc” that delivers benefits.  
        On a personal level, relations between socialist Felipe González were cordial and fruitful 
with all of his counterparts in Lisbon. José María Aznar enjoyed a warm personal relationship 
with Portuguese socialist Prime Minister Antonio Guterres and later continued the pattern with 
conservative José Manuel Barroso. The current coincidence of Social-Democratic administrations 
in Spain and Portugal should make the Spanish-Portuguese tandem a fruitful alliance. 
Subsequently, Rodríguez Zapatero offered Portuguese premier José Sócrates to share the 
responsibility of acting as engines of the new General Secretariat, beginning with a joint 
presidency of the summit, to take place in Salamanca, very close to the border. 
        Reinforcing the cultural links that make the backbone of the project, the decision taken by 
Brazil to make the Spanish language compulsory in the schools has presented a challenge to 
 16Spain to provide part of the necessary teaching resources. This move will also constitute an 
incentive for the neighbors to learn Portuguese, a pending matter that is also evident in Spain 
regarding the poor command of Portuguese shown by Spaniards.        
        Another timely advantage is that all this is happening while Spain has been promoting the 
project for an “Alliance of Civilizations”, an idea originally presented by Spain’s Prime Minister 
Rodríguez Zapatero at the United Nations General Assembly last fall. It was endorsed by 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, and was backed by the government of Turkey, co-presiding the 
initiative with Spain. The Ibero-American Community is an alliance formed by countries born as 
a result of a bloody clash of civilizations emanating from 1492. Spain and Portugal themselves 
are among the most mixed communities in the world, the product of invasions, migrations, 
internal wars and racial cleansing and interacting, some of the trends that were exported to the 
Americas by conquistadors and emigrants. Ibero-America has now a unique opportunity to act in 
unison in an atmosphere of diversity.
31  
        Meanwhile, the United States, an unavoidable partner in the continent where most of the 
urgent actions of the Ibero-American community are to be implemented, is facing troubles of 
leadership regarding the adventure of the war and occupation of Iraq, and the fight against 
terrorism. Having the Ibero-American group on board in a common program of social 
development and economic progress, may give Washington a needed respite and an opportunity 
to accept the loyalty of the Iberian members. Alliances with traditional allies are a much better 
policy than ad-hoc deals with adversaries. 
        However, the most impressive asset that the Ibero-American system has within its year to 
become a success is the double added value provided by what is called in contemporary terms the 
“civil society” and a new aggressive presence of Spanish business interest implanted in Latin 
America.
32 Used and abused by rhetoric, the human dimension linking Iberia and Latin America 
is the lasting legacy not of the colonial official control, but generated by anonymous migration. 
Experts have called this special dimension linking Spain (and Portugal) and Latin America a 
“subterranean” relationship. There is not a region of Spain, nor a family that does not have a 
recent or distant experience of a family member migrating to one Latin American country, forced 
by hunger, lack of opportunities, political repression and exile. This makes the Spanish 
experience of America not a foreign adventure but a feeling of being “at home”. 
        This sense of belonging and of making normally risky operations a natural bet that deserves 
to be tested is what is behind, besides objective financial and economic records, the spectacular 
landing of Spanish investment in Latin America in the 90s, still in force today. Memory, customs 
and language are not enough arguments to justify important trade and investment operations, but 
they help in endorsing business calculations and financial prospects. 
How this investment dimension might be inserted in the framework of the Ibero-American 
summits is open to speculation. What has been until now a bilateral strategy led by some key 
sectors of the Spanish economy has the potential of receiving considerable reinforcement 
especially if some of the policies and programs to be implemented under the umbrella of the 
Ibero-American system receive substantial attention and resources. For example, the plan to 
barter debt for educational programs may propel the impressive cultural industry of Spain to 
make an aggressive move in Latin America where it already enjoys an advantageous base. 
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 17        In any event, no matter what is the overall strategy, Spanish interests are not free from any 
of the threats and challenges current looming over the Latin American landscape and the overall 
inter-American scene. Let’s keep in mind that Spanish investment has been the target of double 
harassment emanating from U.S. and Latin American sources. Competition in a region that until 
very recently has been considered as a monopoly of U.S. companies has not received any sign of 
welcome. Spanish aggressive operations in the field of communications, banking and energy have 
caught U.S. interests flatfooted. Moreover, in Latin America, Spanish presence has been 
identified first with conquistadors, missionaries, and colonial administrators. After independence, 
immigrants, political refugees, and religious representatives traditionally represented Spain. They 
were, respectively, filling some needed spots in the society, without constituting a threat to the 
system that just a few (some leftist individuals and practitioners of the Theology of Liberation) 
dare to confront.  
        Then,  all  of  a  sudden,  waiters  and  corner bodegueros were substituted by financial and 
energy officials who dressed in pinstriped suites and carry attachés full of contracts and cell 
phones with worldwide reach. That was news. The fact that some of the businesses were in high 
level profile of communications and commodities touching the daily lives of millions of Latin 
Americans produced a sort of resentment in the eyes of nationalistic observers who observed with 
alarm the passing of privatized industry to the new conquistadors. It remains to be seen if the 
current wave of populism will find a suitable prey in this sector. It also remains open for future 
analysis if the arrogant Spaniard has substituted the old-fashioned ugly American.                                                           
        In any event, Latin American leaders could grab the opportunity to take the initiative and use 
this Ibero-American platform as an alternative, complementary setting to include the EU agenda 
towards Latin America, as expressed in the summits encompassing the European, Latin American 
and Caribbean states, that are to meet again in Vienna in May 2006. The Ibero-American 
Community, in essence, should be functioning as a lobby similar to the one that the French 
speaking counties have enjoyed in the African, Pacific, and Caribbean (ACP) bloc, before and 
after the accession of the former British colonies, when the UK membership altered considerably 
the nature of a bloc of aid-receiving countries that was earlier basically African. 
        In a way, replicating the uniqueness of the nature of the EU, the Ibero-American complex 
could exploit its lack of comparison and built strength from its isolating example. After all, other 
experiments in similar regions (the Arab world as the most obvious) that may show a cultural 
common fabric have been a failure that needs not to be repeated. Exporting a successful example 
of cooperation among countries only sharing heritage and not current conditions might be a 
thought to be considered. There is nothing to lose and potential partners in the hemisphere may 
find it profitable to join.           
 
Obstacles and challenges 
 
On the negative side, one still can detect a limited perception of the true potential of the Ibero-
American process as system. This is an additional expression sparingly used by some enthusiastic 
experts to describe its consistence and solidness, beyond the weakness of its cyclic performance 
around its summits. Moreover, the negative image includes the capability for selecting an agenda 
with a guarantee to be implemented with success 
This means that it should be equipped with a budget well above the funds designated to 
cover the payroll of the basic staff infrastructure. This budget should be used to cover for the 
expenses of the annual summits, as well as for administering the cooperation programs developed 
by the Ibero-American process.
33  Taking into account that the Latin American countries resist 
                                                           
 
33 For a panorama of the cooperation programs in the summit framework: Juan Antonio Sanahuja, “Abriendo 
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 18commitment for a common funding in more important forums than the Ibero-American process 
the prospects of success in this setting are extremely limited. Just about US $ 5 million to support 
the General Secretariat’s operations with a small staff of professionals in different degrees of 
government detachment is not an impressive banner to pitch the sustainability of the process. The 
Ibero-American complex will then suffer the image competition of the EU framework that enjoys 
considerable aid and trade resources with its own budget.
34  
That also means that the process, if it really wants to shed the perception of Spanish 
dependency, has to drastically alter the budgetary contributions when Spain appears to pay more 
than 80% of the expenses and Portugal barely 1.41%, while some important Latin American 
countries are well below their real capabilities (Brazil 5.17%; Mexico 5.18%; Argentina 2.97%). 
At the end of 2004, some important countries (Venezuela and Brazil, among them) had not yet 
paid their contributions since 2001. Paradoxically, the need to avoid the appearance of a Spanish 
hegemony will not hide the obvious wish by Spain to prime this Latin American dimension as 
part of a wider world foreign policy. Much the same way as U.S. foreign aid cannot be seen 
simply as an altruistic, charitable agenda, the Ibero-American cultural setting and political and 
economic investment made by Spain should be understood as an integral part of foreign policy. 
The question remaining is: to what extent and with what limits? 
35 
During the whole process, any Latin America resistance or unkind attitude towards the 
active and sometime aggressive policy of Spain have not been shown in public (with the few 
exceptions centered around the role of Cuba) mentioned above centering or even with veil threats 
and notices of vetoes for measures and approaches that seem to be beyond the scope of the 
original Ibero-American idea. This record might be attributed to the highly respected protocol 
among the Ibero-American family especially when recognizing the well-deserved prestige of 
Spanish democracy and its institutions, specially the King. The fact that most the expenses have 
been defrayed by Spanish funds also has considerable weigh. In practical terms, the behind the 
scenes attitude has been: if the Spaniards are willing to pay, what can we say but thanks? Again, 
the question is the same: until when and with what limits?
36.                               
In any event, one should report a contrast between the good intentions and positive 
diplomatic declarations issued by Latin American leaders and the ambivalent mischievous smiles 
that simultaneously welcome surveys and questioning of experts in the field, when asked about 
the prospects and feasibility of the process beyond its current shape. However, with the same 
guarded attitude not to be revealed in public, numerous Latin American political and economic 
leaders see the Ibero-American experiment as an alternative to balancing the obvious dependency 
of the United States overpowering security, military, and economic hegemony, Still, continental 
and world-wide realities force the same observers to look towards Washington for cues and 
moves.  
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 19In this sense, a rephrasing of a popular statement attributed to long lasting and 
authoritarian Mexican president Porfirio Díaz, for some Latin American countries the problem is 
to be so far from Spain and Europe and so close to the United States. Moreover, experts and 
leaders are not in agreement regarding the convenience and advantage of an alliance without 
conditions with Spain (Portugal is a much minor partner) if that implies causing friction with 
other European business and political partners that still have considerable weight in Latin 
America. That category includes mainly France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and to a 
minor extend Italy and the Netherlands, depending of business sectors and geographical location. 
Regarding the conversion of the process in a more ambitious, intercontinental free trade 
or economic bloc, any temptation in this direction will encounter internal and external obstacles, 
in addition to the expected contrasts emanating from each of the individual actors, depending on 
their state of security and economic dependency. In view of the fractious state of the Western 
Hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the Ibero-American group is faced 
with certain alternatives, some offering advantages, but none free from risks. It is obvious that the 
continent offers two geographical alternatives, one led by the United States and the countries still 
willing to follow the path set in 1994 and the second composed of most of the MERCOSUR and 
Andean countries that bet for a South American bloc. The Ibero-American group will have to opt 
for a hands-off attitude or betting for an alliance with the South-American side. What remains to 
be seen is what will be the attitude of the “dissidents” who know that their security and primary 
interests lie with the United States.       
In this setting, within the Latin American context, each one of the members will first 
have to define each individual role in the sub-regional schemes (NAFTA, MERCOSUR, etc.) to 
which they belong. Then they will have to set the bloc aims and limitations, before embarking 
into an intercontinental linkage that could contradict the requirements and limitations of both the 
EU and the inter-American or Latin American frameworks. In view of the “red lines” posed by 
the profiles of national sovereignty in Latin America and the resistance for institutionalization of 
the modest intra-Latin America schemes, not much is to be expected from any design for the 
Ibero-American process to go beyond the current limits. 
The experience shown by the dramatic reduction of the status accorded to the SEGIB, the 
message is doubly clear. On the one hand, very little will emanate from Latin America in the 
direction of creating a supranational unit with a minimum of autonomy to represent the bloc in 
world forums. On the other hand, funding appears to be lacking. Comparatively, a standard 
evaluation of international networks equipped by small or large staff is that institutions without 
political and financial power are reduced to simple bureaucracies. Enrique Iglesias will then have 
to walk a thin line to balance his mission for efficiency with avoiding overstepping on any 
sensitive toes. Although the status of observer at the United Nations is an improvement, it 
remains to be seen how that position will be accorded the representation of the group regarding 
measures and decisions. In this line of thought, the most formidable risk presented to the Ibero-
American process will be the temptation of using it for national or personal gains, especially if its 
stature is enriched in the international setting. A move to radicalize it, if only in the discourse and 
verbal setting, may trigger a reaction of the moderate governments and the ones opposing its use 
for confrontational policies, especially if they target the interests of the United States. Keeping a 
low profile may in turn mean inertia and business as usual. 
In any event, a key factor for getting some answers for this dilemma depends on the 
individual and overall results of the dozen elections to take place in Latin America by the end of 
2006. If a majority of center-left and radical leftist governments come to power and act as such, 
and some of the incumbent presidents of this inclination are consolidated, any kind of forums 
may seem to be good for deepening anti-U.S. postures. However, it is doubtful and remains to be 
seen if the Ibero-American system will become one. Nonetheless, in the event of a continuation 
of a disdainful or erratic policy of the United States towards Latin America, Spain may interpret it 
as an further invitation for political incursions in a continent where its economic interests are at 
 20stake. The election of Evo Morales in Bolivia and the deepening of the radicalization of the 
Chávez regime may indicate a signal for a more assertive and at the same time prudent Spanish 
policy in Latin America, in tune with other European partners worried about the trend. 
Uncertainty regarding Spanish energy investments in the Andean countries and Argentina will 
then be a key factor in this case.    
In conclusion, the Ibero-American project depends more on the good will and the positive 
evaluation done by the Latin American countries than on the potential and means supplied by 
Spain and its geopolitical ambitions. A key fitting argument is the perception that this move is 
generated in the United States and Canada. An option often followed in North America, 
especially in the United States, is that in principle any European intrusion in Latin America is 
considered as a violation of the remains of the Monroe Doctrine and suspect of presenting a 
counterbalance to the US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. When political incursion has 
been supplemented by economic enterprises, it has usually been considered as adding insult to 
injury. In general, then, what has been good for Europeans in America has been judged as bad for 
the United States. In a global economy this logic does not always apply. Economic partnership 
and loyal competition might be in the long run mutually profitable.  
Canada, with its long tradition of combining economic activity and political cooperation 
with development aid and peace keeping operations, should aim at making the Ibero-American 
process an advantage and not a negative challenge.  Still, it all depends on the outcome of the real 
interest of the Latin American countries in the upgrading of the Ibero-American process. In the 
event that a leftist wave takes over and then proceeds to use the forum as an anti-U.S. mechanism, 
the dilemma for Canada will be to choose between what has been very often an affordable policy 
of confronting Washington in limited issues such as Cuba and pondering about a global strategy 
in which much more is at stake. In any case, with popular pressure in the increase for stressing the 
differences in national identity with the powerful southern neighbor, the Ibero-American system 
may offer a suitable channel. 
In any case, the lack of regulatory definition regarding the status of observers and special 
guests for the Ibero-American summits and process has been accompanied by petitions to 
participate and unclear individual requests seeking to be invited.
37 The flexibility that exists in 
multilateral diplomacy will surely find creative solutions for it appears to be considerable outside 
interest in the process. This solution will certainly accommodate the inclusion of actors in North-
America, the Caribbean, the African Portuguese countries and some other European states 
speaking languages of Latin origin. 
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